Cory Aquino was an unusual politician
in the sense that, when she said that she was going to pray and
meditate before making a decision to run for President, there is
evidence that she actually did so (l. 10820). The Church also came to
her secular aid. Cardinal Jaime Sin brokered a deal with Salvador
Laurel, a career politician in every positive and negative sense, in
which Laurel agreed to run in the 1986 election as Cory's Vice
President, in order to present a united front against Marcos (l.
10830).
Cory initially made some inexpert moves
in the US news media, which was less obedient that its local
counterpart. This gave Marcos-hugging conservatives all the excuse
they needed to line up against her as a lightweight and not up to the
job. As a result, Cory's entourage (aided by the American designer of
her private estate's golf course) hired a US effective public
relations firm. Cory's supporters had to keep the association
low-key, as they had previously sneered at Marcos for doing the same
thing. Her main PR adviser in Manila was presented as a British
journalist (which he had been), partly in order to de-emphasize the
US connection (l. 10844)
However, non-official Americans played
a variety of supporting roles, including fund-raising and security.
The US Embassy also provided support to the extent that they could
without attracting the attention of President Reagan and other
conservatives in Washington. The US Agency for International
Development financed, directly or indirectly, several programs which
had the effect of undermining Marcos's authority. Ambassador Stephen
Bosworth was publicly circumspect, but was privately reported to have
said: “If Marcos tries to stay in power, we'll disintegrate him in
thirty days” (l. 10858).
But ultimately, control of the ballot
boxes was more important than who supported you. “Election day,
February 7, 1986, was marred by the usual cases of stolen ballot
boxes, intimidation and even killings, almost all of it by Marcos's
thugs. The serious cheating, though, came in adding the vote” (l.
10883). Independent vote-count monitors took refuge in a Catholic
church, “contending that the figures showing Cory in the lead were
being discarded” (l. 10885). A State Department task force provided
massive evidence of cheating. But the Reagan administration preferred
its own sources of information, including that from Imelda's calls to
Nancy Reagan. Republican Senator Richard Lugar was dispatched to try
to whisper some reality in Reagan's ear (l. 10897). Reagan claimed to
have see a television report which featured Aquino's supporters
destroying ballots – the report actually showed Marcos's supporters
doing so. While the White House issued statements supporting Marcos
and implying that the cheating on Aquino's side was as large as on
Marcos's, Lugar publicly said in a speech that the President was
wrong. “A few hours later, Marcos announced victory – and the
first foreign envoy to congratulate him was the Soviet ambassador”
(l. 10921).
In Manila, Bosworth had to bear the
brunt of Aquino's displeasure, and offer excuses. “It sometimes
takes us a while to reach the right conclusion, but I'm convinced
that we will. Please be patient” (l. 10915). Bosworth then made his own
displeasure clear to the State Department, which lead to a call from
Secretary Schultz, who said “We'll try to fix it” (l. 10919). Two
days after the election, he sent Philip Habib as a troubleshooting
envoy. After a week observing unrest and talking to people in Manila,
Habib concluded: “Cory had won the election and deserved our
support. Marcos is finished, and we ought to offer him asylum in the
United States” (l. 10933).
Parts of the Philippine Army, which had
been the foundation of his support, began to plot against him, lead
by defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile (l. 10951). They planned to
seize Marcos – but not kill him. Manila apparent leaks like a
sieve, and the plotters bragged about their upcoming activities in
bars and restaurants. Four confederates were arrested. Soon, it was
Enrile's life that was in danger. On 22 February, he held a televised
news conference “revealing that he himself faked nearly four
hundred thousand votes for Marcos in his own region” (l. 10978) and
other duplicity. Enrile and constabulary chief Fidel Ramos holed
themselves up in a loyal army bases in central Manila, while a circus
of additional soldiers and mobile peddlers sprang up around the base.
A confused series of public and private communications occurred
between the main players in Manila, while the conflicted Washington
foreign policy apparatus spun its wheels.
On Monday, 25 February, Marcos made a
series of calls to Senator Paul Laxalt, hoping to arrange a phone
call with Reagan. Between phone calls, Laxalt met with Reagan and
others, who approved asylum for Marcos. Finally, Marcos understood
from Laxalt that he would not be able to speak to personally, and the
US wanted Marcos to step down. “I am so very, very disappointed,”
Marcos said (l. 11103). Before departing his official residence,
Marcos and Imelda stepped out on a balcony and sang a farewell song
to the crowd.
Helicopters flew Marcos to Clark Field.
Marcos said that he wished to spend “a couple of days” at Clark,
but rumors of unfriendly soldiers mobilizing prompted the US
commander to say “I want that guy out of here now.” Bosworth
agreed. “You can go anywhere you want as long as it's out of the
country” (l. 11118). That night, Marcos took off for Guam via
Hawaii.
An avalanche of avarice and chicanery
emerged, followed by lawsuits in many jurisdictions. A grand jury in
Honolulu looked into the purchase of weapons to support a return, and
another in Pittsburgh looked in kickbacks in a Westinghouse nuclear
power project. On 23 August 1988, a New York grand jury issued an
indictment for embezzlement for more than $100 million of Philippine
government money to buy Manhattan property. The investigation
revealed 20 secrets bank accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere (l.
11131).
Marcos died on 29 September 1989, after
ten months in a Honolulu hospital. Cory refused to allow his remains
back into the Philippines (l. 11137).
There were five coup attempts in
Aquino's first year and a half in office (l. 11171). Cory turned out
not to be a miracle worker. Her coalition cabinet was “a basket of
crabs” (l. 11180) who plotted against her. The loose association of
intellectuals, businessmen, clergy, and soldiers who had helped her
into power fell apart when Cory failed to quickly stabilize the
country (l. 11175). “Early in 1987, she held a referendum to
approve her new constitution, a thick, turgid document that defied
easy comprehension” (l. 11178). New legislation contained loopholes
which specifically benefitted her family (l. 11191). There were
accusations of human rights abuses by vigilantes, which Aquino
originally applauded as an example of “people power” (l. 11253).
In 1988, the growth rate was six
percent and new urban construction thrived, but poverty was still
widespread. A 1988 World Bank study said that “there are more poor
people in the Philippines today than in any time in recent history”
(l. 11208), and half the population lived in “absolute poverty”
(l. 11210).
A major impediment to further growth
was the $28 billion dollar foreign debt contracted by Marcos, “which
drained the economy of forty percent of its earnings” (l. 11215).
Another was unchecked corruption. Finally, the Catholic culture discouraged birth
control, leading to a high birth rate, leading to an inability to
provide food, education and jobs.
A side note: There were 56 million Filipinos in
the late 1980s. Karnow says that the population “is expected to
double again by the year 2010” (l. 11232). According to an official website of the Philippine government, a 2006 projection put the 2010 population
at 94 million. The CIA World Factbook estimates the 2012 population at 103
million.
Karnow concludes the book with an
analysis about how the rural Communists insurgents missed the boat in
the anti-Marcos agitation, portraying them as out-of-touch,
posturing, and poorly organized. By the time the book was published
in 1989, events seemed to show that maybe it was Karnow that missed
the boat about the reasons for their failure.
