“Because it has to be made up for him before he can use it” (l. 3343).
Like more recent military adventures,
the US enthusiastically declared victory and patted itself on the back too early, ignoring signs that more trouble
lay in the future. McKinley later said: “If old Dewey had just
sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble
he would have saved us” (l. 2819).
McKinley reflected the national
ambiguous attitude toward imperial adventures. Eventually his public
statements and postures drifted toward favoring a prolonged US
presence in Philippines, with occasional public backsliding and much
ineffective private mind-changing. US decision-makers on the ground
correctly discerned that they had no clear instructions from
Washington on how to act. As a result, each made decisions according
to his (never her) requirements and world-view, often acting at
cross-purposes with other commanders. Statements of colonial
disinterest were followed by attempts to put as much territory as
possible under US control.
Commodore Dewey summoned
exiled insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo from Hong Kong in mid-May
1898. What exactly happened during their first meeting is disputed. The
translation may have been inadequate. Dewey apparently kept no notes
and did not even report to Washington that the meeting took place
until five weeks after it happened. McKinley may have learned of the
meeting from newspaper reports. Here and elsewhere, Dewey had the
habit of revising his memories to fit the situation (i.e., testimony
before the Senate) he found himself in (l. 3035). Aguinaldo's
memoirs maintain that Dewey expressed uncategorical support for the
insurgents and that America “needed no colonies” (l. 3024). At
the end of the meeting, Dewey alleged told Aguinaldo: “Go ashore
and start your army” (l. 3052).
By mid-summer, insurgents had overrun
many Spanish garrisons and had taken 3,000 prisoners. Fourteen miles
of trenches (l. 3068) had been dug around the old city wall of
Manila, where the remaining Spanish sheltered in increasing dire
conditions. Aguinaldo ignored advisors urging caution and commissioned
a national anthem, a flag, and a declaration of independence, the
last of which he read in a public ceremony on 12 June 1898. The
document was signed by 97 Filipinos and one American, a visiting
businessman from Shanghai. Dewey ignored the invitation to the
ceremony, explaining that it was “mail day” (l. 3109).
Meanwhile, additional troops, usually
freshly recruited in the US, were gathered and dispatched. On the way to
Manila, the first convoy captured Guam easily after discovering that the
Spaniards there were unaware that a state of war existed (l. 3170).
The arrival of boatloads of American soldiers naturally created
suspicions that the US was in the a Philippines for the longer term,
and that Dewey and other leaders had shown bad faith in previous
talks.
American military commanders wished to
attack Manila's old city and capture the besieged Spaniards there. The
problem was that they could not do so without attacking or
overrunning the insurgents who now surrounded the city. The American
commanders tricked the insurgents into withdrawing from a sector of
the perimeter by promising (but never delivering) cannons (l. 3246).
The besieged Spanish realized their
situation was hopeless. They wished to make the best of it by
surrendering to the Americans. They very reasonably felt that the
Americans would be more merciful, and less reasonably felt it more
honorable to surrender after something resembling a struggle. The two
sides agreed secretly on a charade (hidden from the nominally-allied
Filipinos). Like most conspiracies, it occasionally went off the
rails. For example, when a US commander gave his gunners deliberately
incorrect target coordinates, the gunners (no doubt voicing
salty sentiments about the competence of management) assumed that a mistake
had been made. They corrected their coordinates and made several
direct hits (l. 3289). Similarly, some Filipinos joined what they
thought was a genuine fight, and alarmed Spaniards responded by
shooting back.
The Americans who died during the
battle for Manila were the first US combat causalities. A few days
later, Manila learned that the US and Spain had signed an armistice
the day before the battle.
There ensued peace negotiations in
Paris, from which the Filipinos were systematically ignored and
excluded. It became conventional wisdom from pro-imperialist that the
US must take control over the islands to prevent evil European powers
from taking over. Example: Acting on a baseless report that Filipinos
were thinking of welcome a German prince as a monarch, some German
warships steamed to Manila, getting everyone's undies in a bunch (l.
3318). By this time, McKinley had completed his journey from pacifist to expansionist,
later telling Methodists missionaries that he had arrived after
prayer at the conclusion that it was the US's duty to educate,
uplift, and Christianize the Filipinos (l. 3399). Under the
provisions of the treaty, Spain surrendered the Philippines to the US
in return for 20 million dollars.
Meanwhile, insurgents attempted to both
engage in public displays of honor for American and its troops (whose
short-term protection they still hoped for) and prepare for possible
hostilities. Local conflicts threaten to blossom into international
incidents. Insurgent leadership hoped for the best and made friendly
noises while also attempting to quietly control territory and arm
themselves.
The fight for Senate approval of this
treaty was long and hard. Many powerful and influential people were
still firmly against foreign entanglements. McKinley bartered
judgeships and other patronage. The treaty passed only by the
tie-breaking vote of Vice President Garret Hobart (l. 3682).
Interesting details:
- The US Consul in Hong Kong at that time, Rounseville Wildman, agreed to purchase weapons and ammunition for the insurgents. Wildman accepted a 117,000 Peso down payment but never delivered. He disappeared in a shipwreck in 1901 and is “honored today in a commemorative plaque ... in a State Department lobby” (l. 2979).
- From a newspaper column of Peter Finley Dunne: “ 'I know what I'd do if I was Mack,' said Mr. Hennessey. 'I'd hist a flag over th' Ph'lippens, an' take in th' whole lot iv thim.' 'An' yet,' said Mr. Dooley, ' 'tis not more thin two months since ye larned whether they were islands or canned goods.' (l. 3444)“
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